Creative economies and research universities by Murphy, Peter
 1 
Peter Murphy Pre-Publication Archive 
 
This is a pre-publication article. It is provided for researcher browsing and quick 
reference. 
 
The final published version of the article is available at: 
 
‘Creative Economies and Research Universities’ in M.A. Peters and D. Araya (eds) Education in the Creative 
Economy: Knowledge and Learning in the Age of Innovation (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), pp 331-358.
 2 
Creative Economies and Research Universities 
 
 
Peter Murphy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter Murphy 
Associate Professor of Communications 
Director, Social Aesthetics Research Unit 
School of English, Communications and Performance Studies 
Monash University Clayton Campus 
Wellington Road 
Clayton Victoria 3800 
AUSTRALIA 
Peter.Murphy@arts.monash.edu.au  
 
 
http://arts.monash.edu.au/ecps/communications/staff/peter-murphy/   
http://arts.monash.edu.au/pasa/   
http://www.petermurphyweb.net/   
http://the.sagepub.com/  
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
After the Culture Wars, now come the Economy Wars 
When the world recession in 2008 began, the economy wars, which had been 
dormant for two decades, flared again. After thirty years of the culture wars, this came 
as a bit of a relief. In one corner, we had the followers of John Maynard Keynes 
(1883-1946), who were filled with a kind of self-belief that we had not seen since the 
1960s. They had a few scores to settle. In another corner were the market-friendly 
followers of Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) and Milton Friedman (1912-2006). They 
were looking a bit bloodied after having dominated public policy for two decades. 
Looking on skeptically from outside the ring was another cohort, the admirers of 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950). These were, as usual, less combative than the other 
pair, and had a quizzical eye trained on both of the pugilists.  
Part of the skepticism of the Schumpeter camp was a wariness of public policy 
tout court. It didn’t matter whether this was a policy bent on big government or one in 
love with small government. Schumpeter had been a student of the great Austro-
Hungarian Empire Finance Minister, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. Schumpeter himself 
was the first Minister of Finance of the modern Republic of Austria. He seemed to 
take away from that unusually intimate experience of public policy a strong sense of 
the need for economists to look beyond the policy cycle, and explore the deeper 
structures and long-run temporalities of economies. Schumpeter was a great 
economist who at the same time understood the power of history and society in 
shaping economies. He also appreciated the power of the imagination. He observed 
that modern capitalist economies were driven as much by creative impulse and 
imaginative insight, as they were by the more commonplace behaviors that arose out 
of greed, interest, need or calculation. It was not that societies could not—or should 
not—control such behaviors or encourage them, depending on prevailing economic 
philosophy. It was just that some of the most decisive economic outcomes could not 
be determined by such policy tools. Somewhere beyond them, in a larger social-
historical zone, lay the human drive to innovate and create.  
This is a view at odds with both Keynesianism and the contending 
philosophies of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. It sits at a tangent to both 
‘liberal’ and ‘neo-liberal’ views of the world.  Whether it is the social liberalism of 
the Keynesian or the classic market liberalism of the anti-Keynesian, each exemplifies 
the manner in which economists became enthralled by the temporal horizons of public 
policy and indifferent to the deeper cultural and historical causes of economic and 
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social prosperity. Economic crashes, such as the one that occurred in 2008, trigger a 
stock set of responses. Keynesians suppose that capitalist economies tend to 
stagnation and that the motive force of these economies is immoral. Economies 
accordingly must be stimulated by government spending in order to return an 
economy to prosperity, and then must be regulated with a sure hand. So contracts for 
public works are used to sustain businesses. Government bail-outs rescue firms from 
insolvency. In a recession, with declining revenues, a government can still spend 
more if the state increases tax levels, borrows from banks, or prints money. All 
economic policy tools, however, have limited and negative effects. Higher taxation 
means less consumer spending and less investment. Government borrowing competes 
with private borrowers, restricting business access to credit and pushing up the price 
of money. The repayment of high levels of public debt is a long-term drain on the 
economy. Printing money on the other hand causes rampant inflation and government 
spending is often wasteful. Neo-liberals are a much more optimistic breed than 
Keynesians. They assume that capitalism tends to prosperity, politics is a primary 
cause of recession, competition is effective, and self-interest is not immoral. Market 
failures are caused by too much regulation, too much taxation, and too much 
government borrowing. Yet market liberals on the whole show only a muted interest 
in the roles of management, technology and industrialization in securing the success 
of markets. The firm is peripheral to their explanation of economic dynamism.    
Schumpeter’s understanding of capitalism differed in significantly interesting 
ways from both Keynes and Hayek. He thought that the capitalism that he observed 
was dynamic not stagnant, but that its dynamism came not from markets in general 
but from the power of innovation that had been unleashed by modern industrial 
capitalism. Schumpeter took a long-term view of economies. From this historical 
viewpoint, economic crashes are a normal part of the dynamics of modern capitalist 
economies. Periods of genuine prosperity and long-term increases in wealth and 
general standards of living are followed, as night follows day, by a sequence of 
speculative boom, slide, panic, crash, and recovery. Boom-time actors never predict, 
and cannot predict, the time of the crash. They always think the good times will last 
forever. But in fact business cycles trend in waves, up and down. These waves cycle 
over the short, medium and long-term. Schumpeter was most interested in the long-
term dynamics of capitalist economies because these, he observed, had the most 
important effects of all. Public policy, in contrast, is concerned principally with short-
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term effects. Public policy instruments have moderately foreseeable impacts that run 
over periods of eighteen months to three years. Very few tax or spending policies 
have observably sustainable effects beyond that. Yet, as Schumpeter outlined in his 
classic work The Theory of Economic Development in 1911, the most powerful 
drivers of modern capitalism work over periods of twenty, thirty, sixty years and 
more. These are the forces of innovation that create new industrial sectors. 
The first chapter of The Theory of Economic Development set out a model of a 
static capitalist economy. This is essentially what the tradition of economics from 
Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill to John Maynard Keynes thought a capitalist 
economy looked like. Like all economies hitherto, it had no real endogenous driver of 
growth. Schumpeter noted that a handful of economies, beginning with Britain in the 
1820s and Germany in the 1840s, behaved differently. They had a built-in source of 
expansion. Schumpeter set out to explain what this was in the brilliant second chapter 
of The Theory of Economic Development. ‘Development’ meant those changes in 
economic life that are not forced from without but that arise from their own initiative 
from within.
1
 In this economy, change does not occur continuously but in fits and 
starts. This is a type of economy that tends not towards homeostatic equilibrium but 
rather towards dynamic equilibrium.
2
 This is a mildly enigmatic form of equilibrium, 
a kind of balance that is slightly off-balance all the time. Schumpeter explained the 
discontinuous change, the periodic ruptures, and the disturbances in the economic 
equilibrium of modern capitalist economies with one word: innovation. Periodically 
the most advanced industrial economies go through a phase of intensive innovation. 
At the heart of these innovations are new combinations of economic materials and 
forces. What follows from these new combinations are new goods, new methods of 
production, new markets, new sources of supply, and new kinds of organization. What 
these in turn create are new leading industrial sectors. This occurred with the 
Manchester cotton industry in 1780s, the railroads in the 1830s, Pittsburgh steel in the 
1870s, the Detroit car industry in the 1910s, and the Silicon Valley information 
industries in the 1980s.  
The ICT industries reached maturity around 2000. That point was symbolised 
by the pricking of the dot.com stock market boom. In another thirty years, the ICT 
companies will probably look a lot like car companies did in the 1970s—far removed 
from their glory days. At the point of a serious market recession, the interesting 
question to ask is what new leading industrial sector will emerge?  Unfortunately this 
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is difficult to predict. It is not the ‘known quantities’ that are going to constitute a new 
sector. If they did, how easy it would be to foretell the future. But, in reality, it is what 
is least known that is most important. From the standpoint of the unknowable future, 
capitalism’s ‘new wave’, whatever it proves to be, will not be ‘green technology’, the 
pop economics obsession of 2008.
3
 Versions of that neologism have been 
commonplace since 1973 when the economist E.F. Schumacher (1911-1977) 
published his influential volume of essays Small Is Beautiful.
4
 Schumacher, a young 
protégé of Keynes, was deeply influenced by Catholic mysticism. While the intuition 
of the mystic is arguably a better cognitive model than rationalist prediction when 
dealing with the tricky matter of social creation, Schumacher’s insight was original in 
the 1970s, not today. Whatever will form the leading economic sector thirty years 
onwards from 2008 is unknown and is only now being conceived in obscurity. What it 
is that makes such a thing possible is the uncanny conjunctions of the imagination. 
Such conjunctions are like the punch lines of great jokes. They are not predictable. 
They are not warmed-over clichés like ‘the green automobile’. 5 When personal 
computers first appeared, the typical reaction was that ‘they won’t catch on’. Most 
observers did not say—‘oh let’s trade in the mainframe computer for the PC’. IBM 
certainly didn’t say that, and it nearly destroyed the company. Similarly when 
technology becomes a favourite of public policy (‘a computer on every school child’s 
desk’) it is already closer to being a sunset than a sunrise industry.  
New industry sectors provide the basis of sustained periods of economic and 
social prosperity. Orthodox policy instruments like state taxes or budgets play 
relatively little role in economic innovation. Cities and regions are much more central 
to such innovation, a point made very clearly by the urban economist Jane Jacobs 
(1986, 1969) and, later on, by the urban sociologist, Richard Florida (2002).
6
 One 
case bears this out strikingly. The most robust economy in the world after the 2008 
global slump was Australia’s. In 2009, it held the rate of unemployment to 5.8% and 
the economy grew in the first two quarters of that year (Uren & Hohenboken, 2009). 
In comparative terms, this was remarkable. It was the result of three factors: a flexible 
national labor market, global export growth, and powerful local urban economies. 
This was an economy that displayed strong ‘glonacal’ characteristics.7 It fused global-
export, national-flexible, and local-urban features in efficacious and uncanny ways. 
Firms reduced labor hours (thereby reducing the unemployment rate), low interest 
rates compensated for the income loss represented by flexible lower working hours, 
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the international demand for natural resources and Australian undergraduate higher 
education places (Australia’s number three export industry) remained high, and 
Australia’s urban economies continued to be a powerful source of demand.8  
Public policy is a contributor, but only one contributor, to long-term economic 
well being. Australian national economic policy through the years of the Hawke-
Keating (1983-1996) and Howard-Costello (1996-2007) administrations explains in 
part, but only in part, the capacity of the country to withstand the worst of the 
economic downturn in 2008. Policy-makers de-regulated the labor market and re-
regulated the universities. Such policies, though, were meaningless without the 
support of flexible firms, first-class urbanism, and internationally-focused 
universities. This combination laid the foundation for the emergence of Australia as 
the ‘Switzerland of the Asia-Pacific’. But, like everywhere else, these developments 
still begged the question of ‘what next’. We will know the answer to that question in 
thirty years time. Much about creation can only be understood in retrospect. We 
understand the future by its past. All industry sectors, we know, eventually mature. 
That will apply to Australia’s higher education export industry. Higher education for 
export became Australia’s prime ‘new industry sector’ as the country emerged from 
the 1980s. It became Australia’s answer to Silicon Valley. It was not clear at the time 
that this was the case, and the extent of the growth of this new sector only became 
widely understood as late as the 2000s. By 2009, Australia, with a population 
approaching twenty-two million people, had a half million foreign students in 
residence.
9
 Conversely the sector was showing distinct signs of maturation and the 
inevitable strains that accompany sector maturity.
10
    
When the education export sector reaches maturity, what will then serve as the 
new quinary industry sector? What will supplement, and in part succeed, the 
quaternary information, education, research and development (IERD) sector? The 
most that we can reliably predict, based on past experience, is that cities and city-
regions will continue to be the crucible of new sector creation.
11
 They are the point of 
intersection of art, science, production and distribution. Perhaps, given the speed of 
state-directed urban creation that we see in China and elsewhere, the template-like 
‘manufacture of cities’ might even emerge as the quinary sector of the future. Yet, in 
spite of the fact that we can imagine such a thing, the workings of large-scale urban 
economies remain far from fully understood. This is in part because, in their case, 
economic factors are invariably overlain with aesthetic factors. In urban economies, 
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aesthetic, design and taste cultures intersect powerfully with housing and 
infrastructure demand. The discipline of cultural economics that might explain this 
remains undeveloped. The mutual suspicion of art and economics doesn’t help this 
state of affairs. This suspicion applies even to economists with bohemian connections 
like Keynes. John Maynard Keynes’ view of economies echoed that of Edwardian 
elites—namely that capitalism was a failure which proved itself only insofar as it 
generated wealth for Bloomsbury-style art. That art was intrinsic to modern capitalism 
was inconceivable for elites raised in pre-capitalist cultures, as it is equally for elites 
steeped in post-nineteen-sixties anti-capitalist cultures of complaint.
12
                 
A cultural economics would explain the relationship between the arts and 
sciences on the one hand and economies on the other hand. The city, historically, has 
played the key mediating role in this relationship. Cities do several things. First they 
are the place where the arts and sciences flourish. Second, they create aesthetically-
mediated demand. Third, they introduce science into everyday economic and social 
life through technology. Modern economies grow through aesthetically-mediated and 
technologically-mediated demand. Art and science do not create this demand directly. 
Rather their works are conveyed in a series of steps from artistic and scientific 
discovery through various institutional media, notably universities, galleries and 
laboratories, and then via firms and organizations, into the familiar products, 
processes, forms and artifacts of daily social and economic life. The chain of 
discovery-innovation-firm-organization-product-process-artifact is a long one. It is 
also one that is not continuous. Entropy commonly happens at all points along this 
chain. Correspondingly, established markets and firms play little role in the creation 
of new industry sectors. Schumpeter observed that it is new firms at the leading edge 
of new industries that are the core of capitalist innovation. Or, as he quipped, add as 
many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railroad thereby.
13
 These new 
firms are created by entrepreneurs, a class of business leaders who notably are distinct 
from both owners and managers of business. The business class of entrepreneurs is 
perhaps best understood in terms of what the philosopher Hannah Arendt called 
‘action’ (1958). Action is the human capacity to initiate and lead—to bring things into 
the world. The business class of entrepreneurs create new firms that create new types 
of goods, technologies, markets, supply chains, and forms of organization that provide 
the basis for new industry sectors. 
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Innovation and Invention 
In the wake of The Theory of Economic Development, much of the most 
interesting work of twentieth-century economists was devoted to rethinking the 
neoclassical formula that land, labor, and capital are the key factors of production. In 
the nineteenth century, Alfred Marshall already had added ‘organization’ to the 
neoclassical list. Information, knowledge, technology, cities, arts and sciences 
followed Schumpeter’s theory of the role of the entrepreneur. Fritz Machlup (1902-
1983) and Robert M. Solow (1921- ) observed respectively that information and 
technology were as important factors of production as the trinity of land, labor and 
capital.
14
 Machlup was a friend of Hayek’s from their days at the University of 
Vienna; Solow was briefly a student of Schumpeter at Harvard University and later a 
close associate of the great American Keynesian economist Paul Samuelson, another 
of Schumpeter’s students. Machlup coined the term ‘the information society’ and by 
the end of the twentieth century, Machlup and Solow’s ideas had spawned the popular 
notion of the knowledge economy, which crystallized for understandable reasons in 
the wake of the rise of the information technology industries. As California’s Silicon 
Valley grew into an economic powerhouse, the literature on knowledge economies 
ballooned. One of the central institutions of the knowledge economy was the 
university. Both Machlup and Solow were cited by Daniel Bell in 1973 when Bell 
prophesized ‘the coming of the post-industrial society’. One of Bell’s many canny 
observations concerned the central role of the research university in post-industrial 
societies. The research university played an economic and ideological role similar to 
the church in medieval society. The sociologist’s prognosis would eventually be 
echoed by professional economists. Indeed such was the popularity of this idea that 
the American liberal political economist Jeffrey Sachs in 2005 even included the 
funding of universities, laboratories and research as a key developmental step for 
nations seeking a way out of poverty.
15
  
Schumpeter was more cautious. When he wrote his classic work in 1911, he 
was well aware of the role that the arts and sciences played in modern economies. 
Indeed the theory of the arts and sciences as an economic driver goes back to 
eighteenth-century philosophers and political economists like Nicolas de Condorcet 
(1743-1794).
16
 They observed the centrality of inventive knowledge (‘the 
advancement of the arts and sciences’) to modern capitalism—in the same way that 
Adam Smith had noted the key part that ‘foreign commerce’ cities play in dynamic 
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economies.
17
 Yet Schumpeter also drew a distinction between innovation and 
invention. Innovation was the function of the entrepreneurial class. Invention was the 
responsibility of the creative class. There was a division of labor between the two. 
Schumpeter noted that it was not part of the role of entrepreneurs to find or create new 
possibilities. ‘These are always present, abundantly accumulated by all sorts of 
people. Often they are also generally known and being discussed by scientific or 
literary writers.’18 The function of the entrepreneur was not to find or create ‘the new 
thing’ but rather to lead others to accept or adopt it. This was not a division of labor 
between business on the one hand and the arts and sciences on the other. Schumpeter 
was very aware that leadership was just as important in the arts and sciences as it was 
in business, and that the acceptance of significant new ideas is just as difficult in a 
university as it is in a company, possibly more so. He observed that the history of 
science is one great confirmation of the fact that individuals find it exceedingly 
difficult to adopt a new scientific view or method.
19
 So, by Schumpeter’s own hands, 
his carefully-crafted distinction between invention and innovation begins to break 
down. As in all of the great works of creation, there is instability at the heart of things. 
Identities generate distinctions, and distinctions generate identities. That is the very 
nature of the process of creation that Schumpeter was trying to understand.   
Interestingly, Schumpeter thought that innovation was a more difficult thing to 
achieve than invention. This is because innovation is the enemy of habit. Habits, 
including the habits of thinking, are very efficient. Rather than having to consciously 
think through every thing that we do, we form habits and act subconsciously on them 
in a time-efficient manner. One cost of this, though, is that when someone wants to do 
something new, the forces of habit rise up—Schumpeter noted—to bear witness 
against the embryonic project. An entrepreneur is someone who has the will and the 
drive to wear down the forces of habit, and side-line those who cry out that ‘this is the 
way it has always been done’. As a result an entrepreneur must possess a series of 
distinctive traits: a desire to struggle against well-worn ways, to enjoy getting things 
done, to seek out difficulties and engage in ventures.
20
 What Schumpeter was saying, 
in effect, was that while Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) invented the idea of the 
vertical integration of a company, without the ability to impress that idea on his 
associates, and wear down their opposition to it, his idea would have meant little. He 
would never have reaped a massive fortune from the steel business. While this is true, 
the converse also applies. For the inventor—the creator—also must struggle mentally 
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against well-worn ways, enjoy getting things done, and seek out difficulties or engage 
in ventures. Thus, in the end, Schumpeter’s distinction does break down. Invention 
and innovation share common characteristics.                         
 
Appositional thinking 
Given the number of times words like ‘new’, ‘change’ and ‘innovation’ occur 
in his work, it may be a surprise to note that Schumpeter described himself as a 
conservative. It is certainly surprising insofar as the role of the entrepreneur is to 
struggle against ingrained habit. One of the definitions of being conservative is to 
stand for habit against change. But just as most of the revolutionaries of the modern 
age created systems of sclerotic reaction, perhaps it is less surprising that Schumpeter 
the self-declared conservative also became the prophet of innovation. This is like the 
Big Bang, the moment of the creation of the universe, when nothing switches into 
something. If habit is the first economy of the human species, a recipe for the efficient 
use of energies, then habit turned against inefficiency ends in becoming a powerful 
force for change. If that is a paradox, then so is the act of creation that allows 
economies to defy stasis and grow.  
Everything is its opposite. In that idea lies the core conception of creation. 
Schumpeter once said that he had long planned to write a book on conservatism. If he 
had written it, it might have begun with a meditation on the idea of value-free science. 
The words ‘value-free’ tend to be met with bemusement by social scientists today. 
But Schumpeter thought of value-freedom in an interesting way. A value-free science 
was a science that embodied all of the contradictory values of a society—by being one 
step removed from them. That was conservative in the sense that the conservative is, 
in a subtle manner, a sharp critic of all forms of ideology. Schumpeter belongs to a 
class of twentieth-century intellectuals and writers that includes G.K. Chesterton, 
Evelyn Waugh, Marshall McLuhan, Kenneth Burke, Saul Bellow, Daniel Bell, 
Hannah Arendt, Agnes Heller, Christopher Lasch, Cornelius Castoriadis, Roger 
Scruton, Christopher Hitchens, John Carroll, and Peter Berger. Each one of this group 
defies simple ideological classification. Some began, but none ended their intellectual 
careers as socialists or liberals ordinarily understood. Some were not camp followers 
even to begin with. Often they are best identified not by any kind of ‘ism’ at all but 
rather by a tone that either is wry, ironic, comic or skeptical. Tone replaces ideology. 
It is notable that many among this group either wrote comic works or else wrote 
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books or essays about comedy.
21
 Arthur Koestler, in his illuminating treatise on the 
creative act, The Act of Creation (1964), observed at great length the structural 
parallel between comedy and creativity. 
A person can be a conservative of the left as well as the right. That is not 
incongruous for the very nature of the conservative is to deal in incongruities. Wry 
tone rises above the bellows of modern politics. Or as Chesterton put it so well: ‘The 
whole modern world has divided itself into Conservatives and Progressives. The 
business of Progressives is to go on making mistakes. The business of the 
Conservatives is to prevent the mistakes from being corrected.’22 The aspiration to be 
free of the hum-bug of ideology, including the hum-bug of conservatism, might be 
another way of understanding Schumpeter’s sense of himself as a conservative. He 
promised for a long time to write a book on conservatism, but didn’t, which might be 
the best kind of book on the topic. The attitude of the conservative is one of dry 
humor. It is marked by a gleeful insistence in deviating from any right direction in 
thinking. It is executed in witty observations that deliver up unexpected twists and 
turns. Or in the screwed-up face that signifies impatience, disgust, or discomfort with 
human folly. The conservative and the humorist deal in ways of marrying 
incongruities. This might appear to be a useless talent excepting that the most 
successful societies in human history have been riddled with the most amazing 
contradictions and yet managed them with grace. Here we see explained the 
conservative prophet of innovation. What Schumpeter shared with other conservatives 
was an unusual sensitivity to appositions. Appositions are what drive dynamic 
economies.      
Schumpeter’s sense of his own self as a conservative was intimately bound up 
with his view of modern capitalist economies. He observed that what kept those 
economies growing were periodic bursts of innovation. Fundamental to these 
spectacular cloud bursts of ineffable creativity was the ability of entrepreneurs to 
think in new ways about products, markets and organizations. These new ways were 
always new combinations, unprecedented conjunctions of things that people 
conventionally thought of as different and unrelated. To achieve this, the mind could 
not be too partisan or too fixated on one side, one thing, or one approach. Ideology 
means the fixation on one value or set of values in a world that is subject to multiple 
and irreducible value currents. Schumpeter wrote generously about Marx and Keynes 
and Marshall, and many other economists of many different outlooks, because he 
 13 
understood that great ideas come out of an uncanny confluence of often very 
contradictory precepts.  
The conservative stance is to take a skeptical view of all of these in order to 
see what can be done with each of them. The underlying impulse is to conserve them 
all in order to overcome them by marrying them together. Overcoming is not an act of 
abolition but an act of conjuration that takes opposing qualities and, through uncanny 
tactics, forges new ideas from old precepts. Andrew Carnegie took the lateral-
horizontal-procedural (what today is often called the ‘network’ idea) of a market 
economy and fused it with the vertical-hierarchical-personalized forms of the 
medieval and pre-capitalist imagination that the Social Darwinists, who Carnegie 
admired, loathed. This may have been very contrary—but it was also, so far as the act 
of creation was concerned, entirely consistent. Carnegie laid the template, or part 
thereof, of modern organizations. In the same spirit, it may have been paradoxical that 
the conservative Schumpeter was the great modern prophet of innovation, but this was 
for a very good reason. The kind of skeptical conservatism typified by Schumpeter 
illuminates the dynamism of modern capitalism because it grasps the kind of 
appositions that make it possible. It is difficult to over-estimate how peculiar these 
appositions are.  
Appositional thinking is helpful to explain the dynamic mutating forms of 
successful modern societies and economies, without falling into the trap of idolizing 
pyrrhic fashions. The cult of the new is conspicuously mindless. Ironically, it requires 
a conservative instinct to explain innovation. What matters in acts of creation is not so 
much what is new, which often is uninteresting, but rather the surprising takes on 
what is old.
23
 That in a nutshell is the problem of the creative economies. They exist, 
but what drives them is difficult to identify, let alone to subject to public policy 
prescriptions. The simplistic equation of ‘the new’ and ‘the creative’ can be very 
misleading. Schumpeter was the first to distinguish between creative industries and 
mature industries. Creative industries appear dramatically, as if out of nowhere. They 
capture appositions, unlikely combinations of ideas that are seized upon by mercurial 
entrepreneurs. Eventually with the passage of time, creative industries slow down, as 
invention idles and innovation turns into convention, and the profits of innovation 
decline. But at their peak, these industries race ahead on the back of startling ideas. 
They prove themselves to be much more dynamic than other industry sectors.  There 
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is always an element of ‘the new’ in this. But one should also be wary of overstating 
the significance of the new.  
As Schumpeter often observed, creation comes through the unlikely 
combinations of what exists. The word ‘unlikely’ is important. The unlikely character 
of protean combinations requires exceptional insight. The act of conjuration 
underlying them is very unusual. Terms like progress, contemporary, modern, up-to-
date and so on are not always very helpful in understanding these conjurations. Words 
like these point to the temporal dynamic of creation but what they screen out is the 
appositional structures of innovation and invention. It is not time that explains 
creation but rather the finding of similarities in what is dissimilar. Creation connects 
the unconnected. This is a process that is much closer in nature to poetic analogy than 
it is to social progress. The assembly line radically changed the methods of industrial 
production. Henry Ford’s car assembly technique had a very significant impact on the 
organization of labor in the twentieth century. Someone sometime along the way 
looked at the dis-assembly techniques used in the Chicago slaughter houses and meat 
packing plants of the late nineteenth century. Not every person’s way of looking at 
things is the same. Someone looked at the dis-assembly line and imagined it in 
reverse where the parts of the animal were not pulled apart but were put together, this 
time as an automobile. Later in the 1960s, Andy Warhol, who grew up in then 
industrial Pittsburgh, reworked this idea into ‘the Factory’, a multi-medium, output-
driven art loft studio in New York City. This in turn was echoed in the early twenty-
first century business model of the ‘art firm’. From the slaughter house to the 
aesthetic company, we see the analogical power of the mind at work. The analogy 
drawn is not a literary one per se, but it is no less powerful for that.         
 
Creative achievement in real terms 
 One of the great laboratories for understanding the ‘breath of capitalism’—the 
diaphragm-like growth-and-recession pattern of modern capitalist economics—is the 
1980s. That period illustrates a number of very Schumpeter-type issues—the role of 
ideas-production in economic life, and the very interesting matter of where those 
ideas come from. The 1980s saw the start of what became known as ‘post-
industrialism’. Post-industrialism was an imperfect term. It implied that the driving 
forces, the catalysts, of this era were fundamentally different from the industrial age, 
whereas in fact it is the symptoms of what those catalytic forces produced that was 
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different. New information and communication technologies saw the rise of new 
industrial sectors. That was spectacular in its way, but it was not different in ultimate 
type from what had created a previous series of leading industrial sectors and that had 
driven capitalist economies since the latter part of the eighteenth century. In every 
case, the driver was the application of ideas to production, or perhaps more precisely 
the new ways of conceiving goods, markets, and organizations. New in this case 
always meant contradictory or uncanny ideas—like the idea of a soft industry or an 
item of soft ware as opposed to older notion of hard ware, or the imagining of a 
computer as something personal rather than institutional. 
This is at the point where we see Schumpeter exceed all of his students. The 
best of them grasped that knowledge, information, technology—all of those iconic 
words that defined the tail end of the twentieth century—were metaphors for the act 
of creation. Schumpeter, however, saw that creation was an act of metaphor.  He saw 
that words like soft or hard, industrial or service were not just metaphors for 
economies, but that the engines of economies were metaphors. He was not suggesting 
that economics was a kind of literature, but rather that the serious entrepreneur and 
the serious artist, both rare birds, were comparable in nature. Science, technology, the 
social sciences, and so on, are important to economies not just because they invent 
useful, expedient and efficient ways of doing things, but because they are capable of 
harnessing the act of thinking which, at its core, where it is most powerful, is 
metaphoric. A metaphor is a combination, and as Schumpeter repeatedly observed 
innovations come out of combinations. When innovations are in the phase of 
discovery, they emerge out of metaphors. Even the most utilitarian innovation is 
poetic in its origins.  
1980 was a very depressing year in the United States. Inflation was running at 
13% and the unemployment rate was 7.8%. The economy was in deep recession. The 
old power-house industries of the American Mid-West had become rust-belt 
industries. Once the epitome of industrial power, dynamism and innovation, they were 
now mature or over-mature industries struggling to avoid bankruptcy. America 
elected Ronald Reagan as President (1981-1988). The 1980s saw America return to 
economic prosperity. In 1989, inflation was 4.0% and unemployment 5.4%. The 
official policy prescriptions of the Reagan era were neo-liberal, small-government 
policy inspired by the theories of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Arthur 
Lafter. But in fact government spending per capita continued to rise throughout the 
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Reagan years as did government deficits and government debt. Spending to win the 
Cold War drove this, as did the fact that the conservative Reagan had a large streak of 
liberalism in his soul. He was a man of interesting contradictions. He had begun 
political life as a Democrat before switching to the Republican Party. Personal income 
tax fell dramatically in the Reagan years, but Social Security taxes rose. Reagan was a 
man with a grasp of the economics of laughter. He promised that as taxes went down, 
tax revenues would rise. Liberal economists guffawed. But, in truth, economic 
policies often have quantum effects of this kind. As Austrian Finance Minister, 
Schumpeter had experienced that reality at close quarters, and the experience of it had 
made him skeptical of the efficacy of public policy.   
What really made the Reagan years an economic success story was the 
beginning of the rise of the new information and communication (ICT) industries that 
would transform the face of the American economy. The genius of the Reagan 
Administration was to do nothing to throttle this new industry sector in its crucial 
early phase of growth. The ICT industry followed a classic Schumpeter script. It 
emerged from the heat of recession. It was pioneered by entrepreneurial figures (Bill 
Gates, Michael Dell, Steve Jobs, etc.). It generated super-profits. It developed 
separately from existing industries and firms. Yet its technologies and methods of 
organization spread to existing industries and firms, transforming them. Then 
gradually it ran out of creative energy. Its pioneering figures lost interest in 
innovation. They took their profits, and turned to social activism and philanthropy. 
Gates became the Carnegie of his time. As Schumpeter might have observed, it’s a 
pattern; it’s been done before. As the ICT industry took off, sociologists began to talk 
about ‘post-industrialization’. But in fact looking backwards, the emergence of the 
digital communications sector was part of the normal process of industrial capitalism 
at work. What happened in the 1980s was one of the periodic re-energizing phases of 
modern capitalism as a new and unpredicted industry sector took off. American GNP 
per capita, in Year 2000 dollars, rose from $22,346 in 1982 to $27,514 in 1988.
24
 In 
1974, 1975, 1980, and 1982 U.S. real GDP per capita had actually fallen. It rose 
steadily thereafter through to 2008 with the exception of 2001. In 2008 it stood at 
$38,262 in Year 2000 dollars.            
Universities played a part in the ICT-fueled resurgence in the 1980s. But, as in 
the case of all invention, the number of university actors was very small. Discovery in 
a measurable sense is overwhelmingly the preserve of a small number of research 
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universities, and a small number of professors and graduate students from those 
institutions. The decisive fact about research, as about culture creation generally, is 
that it concentrates. The rise of the ICT industry illustrates this perfectly. The 
principal technology building blocks of ICT were devised by a very small cohort of 
professors and PhDs from the universities of California, MIT, Harvard, Brown, 
Stanford, Illinois, Duke, Washington, and Oxford, along with contributions from the 
IBM, RAND, and BBN corporations, the Swiss CERN lab, and the US Defense 
Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency.25 This high level of concentration 
is characteristic of invention generally across the arts and sciences. As Daniel Bell 
noted in 1973, 100 of the 2,500 accredited colleges and universities in the United 
States—or 4% of the total—carried out more than 93% of higher education sector 
research.
26
 And of that tiny group, 1% of them—21 universities—carried out 54% of 
the total of the sector’s research output, and 10 universities were responsible for 38% 
of the total research output. Today there are 2,618 accredited four-year colleges and 
universities in the United States.
27
 In 2009, The Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching classified 96 universities as ‘research universities with 
very high research activity’, essentially the same as Bell’s 1973 figure.28  If we look at 
the top twenty research universities in the world today, defined by output and citation, 
we find that not only are they all American universities, but that they are concentrated 
in specific geographical locations, principally on the Eastern and Western Seaboards 
of the United States and around the Great Lakes, and in the orbit of major nodal city-
regions, some border-hoping.
29
 New York City and Boston together with the strips 
and arcs connecting Los Angeles-San Diego, San Francisco-San Jose, Madison-
Chicago-Detroit-Toronto, Portland-Seattle-Vancouver, and Baltimore-Washington 
DC-Durham-Atlanta are especially prominent. The Houston-Austin-Dallas-Tampa-
Miami arc might one day be competitive with the others.    
Research, and culture creation generally, not only concentrates in space but 
also in time. The rise of the ICT industries was a notable phenomenon in the second 
half of the twentieth century. But it was neither the most measurably creative period 
in American history nor was it time-unlimited. Per capita rates of copyright and patent 
registrations are a good indicator of national innovation. In the case of the United 
States, the peak year for patents registered per capita in the United States was 1916.
30
 
The rate trended downward till 1985 where it stood at 50% of the 1916 peak. It rose 
again, as would be expected, in step with the information technology boom from 1985 
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to the present day. But even at its renewed highest in 2005 it was still only 95% of the 
1916 per capita figure. Notionally American registrations of copyrights per capita 
slightly increased between 1900 and today but only because the number of categories 
of copyrightable objects increased markedly in the same period—meaning that 
copyright registration per capita in real terms actually fell. The decades from 1890 to 
1910 appear to be the peak time for copyright creation in the United States once we 
take into account the increase in copyrightable objects during the twentieth century.
31
 
In 1871, 12,688 copyrights were registered in the United States which had a 
population of 38 million.
32
 That is the equivalent of 0.03 registrations per 100 
Americans. In 1900 that figure had risen to 0.13. In 1925, it was 0.15, 1950, 0.14, 
1978, 0.15. After this plateau, it rises in 1988 to 0.23, and then falls away again to 
0.20 in 1994, then 0.18 in 2000 and 2007. Not only had the figure per capita risen 
only marginally in a hundred years, but in the period since 1900 many new categories 
had been added to the schedule of protected works.
33
 In spite of all the additional 
copyrightable works that this represents, copyright productivity per capita expanded 
negligibly in a century. In real terms, in effect copyright activity shrank. As with 
patents, the peak of copyright registrations in real terms occurred at the turn of the 
century, around 1907, with 0.14 registrations per one hundred Americans.
34
  
‘Creativity’ became a buzz-word in the later part of the twentieth century. The 
rise of the ICT industries encouraged this. Policy makers rushed to embrace labels 
like the knowledge economy, the information society, and the clever country. 
Universities hopped on the bandwagon. Yet there is little evidence that the late 
twentieth century was especially creative. In retrospect, the rise of a new industry 
sector is not something extraordinary. It is rather the norm of modern capitalism. That 
is how industrial capitalism functions, as Schumpeter reiterated ad nauseam. Without 
such invention, we are all dead. Why should we regard it as special? The evidence 
from copyright and patent registrations is that there was no explosive moment of 
innovation in the late twentieth century, even if ICT did manage to recover a badly 
faltering technology momentum that had reached a bleak bottom during the 1970s.  
Achievements in fundamental discovery are even less impressive when we 
step back and look at them in historical perspective.
35
 Per capita measures of 
fundamental discovery in Europe and North America strongly suggest that the golden 
age of the visual arts was between the mid-1400s and mid-1500s with a second peak 
in the mid-1600s. Music creation peaks in the early 1700s and sustains a moderate 
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high through to the middle of the 1800s. Western literature peaks in the early 1600s 
and again in the middle of the 1800s. Scientific creativity peaks in the later 1600s and 
then again for a remarkable period from the mid 1700s to the late 1800s. Huebner 
calculated that high-level technology discovery peaked in 1873.
36
 Similarly after 
1870, the rate of major achievement—that is, the number of outstanding figures, 
works and events per capita, in the United States and Europe—in mathematics, visual 
arts, and literature also declines.
37
 There were some countervailing trends: an upswing 
in the number of significant figures (though not works and events) in literature, 
science, and visual art from 1900 to 1920 and an upswing in technology advances in 
the period 1920 to 1950. The film arts flourished in 1940s and 1950s, as did recorded 
music from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.  But overall since 1870 there has been a 
long-term downturn in creativity.      
 
The economics of laughter 
The dynamic of creativity in the last 140 years has trended down with 
punctuated upswings. In the United States, the turn-of-the-century, the late 1920s and 
the late 1980s were relative high spots. The presidential eras of Theodore Roosevelt 
(1901-1909), Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929), and Ronald Reagan (1981-1988) were the 
most creative in the American twentieth century.
38
 This pattern of punctuation, 
though, poses an interesting conundrum. In the last 50 years the overwhelming 
majority of academics in American research universities have identified with the 
liberal wing of the Democratic Party.
39
 Yet the peak of American creation in the last 
100 years occurred during Republican presidencies.
40
 Very few American researchers 
or cultural figures today would identify with Teddy Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge or 
Ronald Reagan. Most would bleach at the very thought of that. Yet such a thought 
may help us better understand one of the primary social conditions for creativity. 
Dean Keith Simonton posed the interesting question: what social factor most strongly 
correlates with periods of peak creation in societies generally? The answer that he 
drew from extensive historico-metrical data was, in a nutshell, political 
decentralization—the division of an overarching political world into autonomous 
states.
41
 Correlated with this is the phenomenon that Philip Tetlock and his colleagues 
dubbed integrative complexity—the ability to tolerate ideological polarities and 
synthesize them.
42
 High-functioning enigmatic political regimes—ones that 
internalize high levels of opposing views and yet at the same time exhibit high levels 
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of integration of those competing perspectives—are crucibles of peak creation.43 A 
society that can cope with opposition at the same time as it can function in an 
integrated manner is a society that is able to meld incongruous values into a rich 
uncanny culture. On paper such a culture might be expected not to work. Yet in 
practice such cultures can and do work—wonderfully.  
The ancient and Renaissance city states are classic examples.
44
 The federal-
state forms and distinctive city-regions of the United States resemble them in a 
structural sense.
45
 However structural patterns, no matter how powerful, do not in 
themselves explain the conundrum of why it is that creative peaks in the United States 
correlate with Republican presidencies. This historical pattern contradicts the 
common assumption that liberal culture best supports research. Tetlock’s conclusion 
that moderate liberalism best aligns with cognitive complexity is widely cited, though 
the underlying studies do have their critics.
46
 Sometimes in these kinds of matters, 
especially where the interpretation of data is contested, it is worth going back to 
basics. About one thing at least there seems to be consensus. A defining characteristic 
of the imagination is that it comprehends things simultaneously in multiple 
dimensions. The imagination is ambidextrous—and integrative complexity, like value 
freedom, is an expression of that. But the very condition of multi-dimensionality begs 
serious questions about the equation of liberalism and complexity.  The psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt conducted a number of survey studies. From these he concluded that 
liberals are politically responsive on the dimensions of protection/care and 
fairness/reciprocity—a commonsensical conclusion.47 He observed that the same 
applies to conservatives but that conservatives are also responsive to three further 
dimensions: in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. If the integration 
of dimensions is a key indicator of imaginative thinking, which very likely it is, then 
the conservative curiously has an edge over the liberal. It might be countered that the 
values of order or authority (for example) are not valid values but that then defines 
complexity out of the equation of integrative complexity. The imagination stretches to 
integrate contrary dimensions. Can a high-functioning contemporary society be 
‘Millian’ without being ‘Durkheimian’ at the same time? Can such a society function 
without an ironic, even comic, relation to what to the great American sociologist 
Talcott Parsons called the AGIL dimensionality of modern society—the adaptive 
(economic), goal-orientated (political), integrative (normative), and latent pattern 
maintenance (cultural) aspects of these societies?
48
  
 21 
Ambidextrousness and paradox are characteristics of strong cultures, and 
strong cultures in their turn are the principal drivers of knowledge.
49
 Comedy and 
tragedy are iconic forms of strong culture. They meld the antithetical and 
incongruous. Shakespeare imagined history in this way.
50
 Shakespeare could be 
cutting toward rebels yet damning of tyrants in same breath. The vocation of science 
that Max Weber appealed to is similar in nature. Its key tenet, value-freedom, is 
double-edged in the same way that history and tragedy and comedy are. The double-
edge of creation exhibits itself in paradoxes—in which nothing is something, division 
and integration are identical, reduced taxes mean greater tax revenues, cats are 
simultaneously alive and dead in the thought experiments of science, and warfare 
economics coexists with welfare economics. Without Eisenhower’s Advanced 
Research Projects Agency and the Cold War, the Internet—the research medium par 
excellence—would not exist. The military-industrial economy stands to the welfare 
economy as Spencer Dryden’s bed-rock martial drum-beat does to Grace Slick’s 
possessed singing on Jefferson Airplane’s 1967 classic hippie-psychedelic 
masterpiece ‘White Rabbit’.51 As Californian Governor, Ronald Reagan had many 
testy battles with the 1968 generation of students and faculty at the University of 
California. Confronted on one occasion by protestors carrying banners saying ‘Make 
love, not war’, he quipped that they probably didn’t know how to do either. Yet for of 
all Reagan’s impatience with the baby-boom generation, it was his successor—the 
ascetic Democrat Jerry Brown—who slashed university budgets and made professors 
teach longer hours, while Reagan’s America saw a jump in R&D spending as a share 
of GDP from 2.1 % in 1979 to 2.7 % in 1984. It has remained around that level ever 
since.
52
  
The lesson of this is that, sometimes, your worst political enemy is in fact your 
best friend. Lessons in irony, in principle, should find a ready audience among 
researchers. After all, in matters of the mind nothing is more profound than the 
economics of laughter. What most becomes the human imagination is wit, and the 
brevity of wit is the mind at its sharpest. Yet while much is said in theory in the 
defence of irony, wit and paradox, in practice earnestness and complaint are often 
allowed to brush them aside. The dangers of that are not political. The ideology of 
researchers has a miniscule impact on politics. Researcher bias is like media bias. It 
has inconsequential effects on the political system. Journalists might be a very liberal 
cohort, but elections are not decided by that. As Paul Lazarsfeld (1901-1976) 
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concluded in the 1950s, the media has a weak influence and minimal effects on the 
political system.
53
 Universities have even less influence on the political system. 
However, arguably, the political system or more precisely political symbolism has a 
significant influence on the universities. This influence may not always be positive. 
Max Weber observed the stifling effect that politics can have on research.
54
 This is 
not because politics is capable of controlling the life of the mind. The ancient Greek 
Stoics already knew that was nonsensical. You can imprison my body but not my 
mind. Much more important are the subtle and indirect effects of political 
atmospherics. Certain common styles of politics have a sullen effect on the mind. 
These styles are ideological, moralistic, and non-ironic. They exhibit few signs of 
integrative complexity. They inspire priggishness and pomposity. They lack value-
freedom and the kind of wit that accompanies it. The joke like the metaphor transports 
us from one idea or one value to another. Wit and analogy are conducted by the 
twists, turns, leaps and jumps of the imagination.
55
 The act of imagination—the act of 
creation—causes us mentally to ‘switch’ sides. This is something that is indispensable 
to the scientist who is able thereby to imagine light as a wave and a particle 
simultaneously. It is not amenable, though, to the political ingénue who feels a deep 
urge to ‘take sides’ without any sense of irony. One wonders whether the triumph of 
the ingénue is reflected in falling rates of discovery and innovation measurable in 
copyright and patent registrations per capita and in the long-term decline in the 
production of great works per capita over the past 140 years in most areas of the arts 
and sciences. If so, the absence of laughter might turn out to be no laughing matter 
after all.  
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1
  Schumpeter (2008), 63. 
2
  Most of the language of economic equilibrium derives from aesthetics. The case of dynamic 
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Hambridge (1867–1924). See Hambridge’s The Elements of Dynamic Symmetry (1967). The paintings 
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5
  The following, reported by the South China Morning Post, is a classic example of the triumph 
of green rhetoric over intellectual substance. ‘A beaming Tony Blair posed for television cameras 
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years. Jian Shuisheng, a professor of optical technology at Beijing Jiaotong University, estimates it 
takes 10kg of polysilicon to produce a solar panel with a capacity of one kilowatt—just enough to 
generate the energy to keep a fridge cool for a day. To make that much polysilicon on the mainland 
would require the burning of more than two tonnes of coal. That amount of coal could generate enough 
electricity to keep the fridge running for two decades.’ Stephen Chen (2009. 
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9
  The number of resident foreign students in Australia doubled in the five years from 2004 to 
2008 (Colebatch & Lahey, 2009).   
10
  Like all industries, the education export industry had its problems, notable in 2009 with 
various scandals connected to sub-standard supplies, quality control, security of consumers, and so on. 
See Marginson (2009). 
11
  On the role of cities in the history of creation, see Peter Hall (1998). 
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  On the adversary culture of mid and late twentieth-century cultural elites, see the critical 
assessment of Daniel Bell (1996 [1976]) and Robert Hughes (1994).   
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  Schumpeter (2008), 64. 
14
  See Machlup (1973 [1962]) and Solow (1956). 
15
  Sachs (2005), 58, 259. 
16
  On the role of knowledge as factor in modern developmental philosophies of history, see 
Heller (1982), chapter 15.  
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  Schumpeter (2008), 93-94. 
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G.K. Chesterton’s body of work in both fiction and non-fiction is peppered with the comic structure of 
paradox. Marshall McLuhan was inspired to write by his early encounter with Chesterton. McLuhan 
published an article on him (‘G.K. Chesterton: A Practical Mystic’) in the Dalhousie Review 15:4, 
1936. McLuhan’s student, Hugh Kenner, contributed an excellent introduction to Chesterton, Paradox 
in Chesterton (1947).  McLuhan built his understanding of communication on brilliant paradoxes like 
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‘the medium is the message’, ‘the typographical essay’, ‘knowing is making’, ‘the mechanical bride’ 
and the ‘global village’. He also observed that the good humour needed to enter into fun and games is 
the mark of sanity and reason.  McLuhan was the classic joker intellectual. A conservative Catholic, he 
was sceptical of moralists and moralism. He combined a love of satire with a joker’s intellectual tool 
kit. He explored paradox by rummaging through mysticism, Pythagoreanism, hermeticism, Modernism, 
Cynicism, Stoicism, New Criticism, and the heterodox orthodoxy of Gilbert Chesterton’s Catholicism 
(Theall, 2006). McLuhan had a deeply satirical and paradoxical cast of mind. In his view, good 
communication was a kind of appositional poetics. This was a view shared by many of McLuhan’s 
peers—ranging from the New Critics William Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks through to Kenneth Burke. 
This was a tradition of thought enchanted by what McLuhan’s Cambridge teacher William Empson 
once—delightfully—described as ‘knotted duality’. It is a state, Empson explained, ‘where those who 
have been wedded in the argument are bedded together in the phrase’.  This is a state that, long ago, 
was recognized by the ancient Stoics. It is the state of antilogy, and its model is the dissoi logi or the 
double argument of the speaker who combines two opposing arguments into a single argument. 
McLuhan reduced such arguments to brilliant catchphrases. In a larger sense, McLuhan and his kindred 
spirits exemplify the flourishing of a strand of culture in North America that has its roots in the 
Renaissance and the Elizabethan world picture. Kenneth Burke (1989) called this cultural current the 
comic corrective. It is fascinated by phrases or scenes that have an agonistic logic. These phrases and 
scenes anchor sense in the non-sense of self-contradictory mottos.  
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  ‘The whole modern world has divided itself into Conservatives and Progressives. The 
business of Progressives is to go on making mistakes. The business of Conservatives is to prevent 
mistakes from being corrected. Even when the revolutionist might himself repent of his revolution, the 
traditionalist is already defending it as part of his tradition. Thus we have two great types—the 
advanced person who rushes us into ruin, and the retrospective person who admires the ruins. He 
admires them especially by moonlight, not to say moonshine. Each new blunder of the progressive or 
prig becomes instantly a legend of immemorial antiquity for the snob. This is called the balance, or 
mutual check, in our Constitution.’ G.K. Chesterton, ‘Column’ Illustrated London News, 19th April, 
1924. 
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element of surprise that a given work invests the forms and repertoire of tradition. Scruton (2007), 45, 
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Switzerland, employee), Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina (University of Illinois undergraduate 
[Andreessen] and programmer [Bina]), Brian Pinkerton (University of Washington graduate student, 
later PhD in Computer Science), Larry Page and Sergey Brin Stanford University Master of Science 
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